Citizen participation in local security policies

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1. Introduction

Over the past three decades, Dutch citizens have come to play an increasingly active role in the sphere of social security and quality of life. Citizen participation focused on this area, has developed rapidly. Whereas about twenty years ago participation mainly confined itself to formal consultation and lobbying, today there is much more room for co-production and co-creation of local policies, in which citizens are able to take decisions themselves.

Citizens, retailers and other parties in the Netherlands are increasingly held co-responsible for a safe environment. Great importance is attached to active, responsible citizens who engage in a constructive manner and in collaboration with government and professional parties. This 'responsibilisation' (Crawford 1998; Terpstra 2010) is also expected from other parties as schools, health organisations and housing associations: security is no longer just a matter for the police. When it comes to quality of life issues and assistance to neighbours, the government is performing more and more a facilitating role. Citizens are expected to implement various quality of life projects (as the maintenance of playgrounds and parks) themselves. In the Netherlands this is often summed up under the heading of a do-it-yourself-democracy (Van de Wijdeven 2012).

Despite the more facilitative role of the local government, many participation projects in the field of social security are directed and managed by the municipality and the police. Sometimes there are bottom-up projects, initiated spontaneously by residents, especially after urgent incidents. For example, a neighbourhood watch group that is founded to counter a series of arsons in the area. Over time, many of these initiatives disappear due to lack of institutionalization. Remarkably often professionals are required to use their specific skills and networks to achieve sustainable citizen participation (Van Stokkom & Toenders 2010; Van Marissing 2008). They often act as flexible frontline workers, responding to the worries and demands of citizens and searching for 'local solutions to local problems' in rather informal ways.

The management of these new participation projects, but also the purpose of empowering citizens, raise several questions. In these projects, professionals are forced to find new ways to shape and order the projects in which citizens participate (Boutellier 2011). As we saw in the introductory chapter of this book, a certain level or public craftmanship is required, which in the context or citizen participation refers to a high degree of personal and professional motivation, well-developed skills to craft forms of cooperation between network-partners. The question is how these professionals are giving shape to this craftmanship and to what extent they are able to act autonomously. Are they motivated to take the engaged role that is expected? How do they try to overcome the difficulties they face in their own organizations and the 'institutional logic' that prevails in it (Hartman & Tops 2005).

When citizens contribute to local decision making, questions arise about the legitimacy of these forms of citizen participation. The participants have to account their decisions to neighbourhood organizations and the broader community. Parts of the local population might feel less well represented; possibly they cannot agree with decisions (such as measures against nuisance of youths) taken by a small group of active citizens. The question is how the professionals involved in these projects, deal with these representation issues: do they attempt to

involve underrepresented citizens and community groups? Do they ensure that account is taken of the interests of non-participating groups?

In this contribution we will take a closer look at three forms of citizen participation in the field of Dutch local security policies: neighbourhood watch teams, 'neighbourhood governs'-committees and residential budgets. These three were chosen because they play an important role in current practices of citizen participation. These three types are different in many respects (purposes, approach and accountability). The neighbourhood watch teams aim to promote safety on the streets; 'neighbourhood governs'-committees prioritize security problems that should be tackled by the police; the goal of residential budgets is to increase the quality of life in specific streets or blocks. There are a variety of professionals involved: neighbourhood watch teams usually are coordinated by community police officers; resident-groups who obtained a budget, liaise with ward consultants or other municipal officials; 'neighbourhood governs'-committees are coordinated by municipal employees or police officers.

We will address two questions:

1. What crafting-roles do professionals adopt in facilitating and guiding these participation projects? In what ways do they establish their 'own' ordering in activities outside the formal policy programming of the organizations involved?
2. How do they deal with problems of representativeness and in which ways do they guarantee public interests during these crafting-activities?

In Section 2, we briefly discuss the background and objectives of the three participation projects and the context in which they occur. Subsequently, we set out how professionals give shape to craftsmanship (section 3). Both their relations with citizens and their relationship with the organizations in which they are employed, are discussed. In section 4 the focus is on how professionals safeguard public interests, against the background of a supposed lack of representativeness. In section 5 the main conclusions are formulated and in section 6 we will discuss some problematic aspects of the participation projects.

2. Three types of citizen participation

We focus on three types of citizen participation which currently receive a lot of attention and which are actually implemented in many municipalities. In each of the three projects citizens take responsibility for a safe and liveable neighbourhood.

2.1. Patrolling the streets: neighbourhood watch teams

Neighbourhood watch teams (or citizen patrols) are formed by residents who patrol the area regularly to enhance security in public space (Van der Land 2014a). Citizens observe public space and are looking for irregularities in the form of deviant, suspicious, antisocial or criminal behaviour or unsafe physical situations. Often they wear recognizable vests or jackets during their patrols. It is estimated that there were about two or three hundred neighbourhood watch teams active in the Netherlands in 2012.

Citizens in neighbourhood watch teams take up responsibility for their neighbourhood spontaneously in more than half (57 percent) of the cases. In a minority of cases, the police (14 percent), community (10 percent), social work (3 percent) or a combination of bodies (9 percent)

are the initiator, after which citizens themselves or in consultation with the police or the municipality assemble their teams. Sometimes residents and agencies take a joint initiative. In all cases, sooner or later, government interferes, either on request from residents themselves, for example when asking for financial support, guidance or training, or on request from the municipality or the police (Van der Land 2014a).

The teams may serve a more or less repressive purpose, like combating arson in a neighbourhood. In the latter case an acute situation necessitates intensive monitoring. But generally the teams arise because of preventive aims. In such cases there is not always an actual unsafe situation. Often it is related to nuisance caused by loitering youth or burglaries in houses (Van der Land 2014a). The teams do not so much operate in truly precarious neighbourhoods, but rather in the more affluent neighbourhoods. There, the purpose of civilian surveillance is mostly to deter potential offenders or troublemakers, and in some cases also to reduce anti-social behaviour. In disadvantaged neighbourhoods objectives are no different, but the problems that citizens face as 'new' co-regulators of public space are much more complicated.

In neighbourhoods where patrolling citizens collectively walk particular routes through the neighbourhood, rules have been set with regard to frequency, form and organisation. Sometimes there is no structural supervision, but patrols occur on an ad hoc basis. In cities as Bergen op Zoom and Tilburg, the municipality has a coordinating role and the teams are institutionalized to a greater extent. The Dutch National Police have not developed a clear policy with regard to neighbourhood watch. Local groups of residents and police officers (by necessity) together develop the best formula for their particular local situation.

The four main functions of neighbourhood watch teams can be summarized as 1) prevention by being visible and preventing nuisance and crime, especially during the evening (and/or night), 2) observing, registering, and investigating, for example reporting rubbish on the street, broken street furniture, etc., 3) performing interventions, for example addressing those who cause public disturbances, and 4) informing and connecting, for example making contacts and finding out what is going on (Van der Land 2014b). Increasingly, citizens in these surveillance teams use technology such as Whatsapp, sometimes supporting, sometimes replacing actual policing patrols. In a substantial number of cases the teams take their activities beyond the mostly undisputed functions of prevention and observation, and intervene in order to change the behaviour of others in public space. Doing so, they are taking over police functions, e.g. by escorting youth that cause nuisance after a night out to their homes. The police therefore need not always be present anymore.

2.2. Citizens involved in decision making:'neighbourhood governs'-committees

The project Neighbourhood Governs in Rotterdam has been a major catalyst for the idea that instead of the police or municipality determining how social insecurity in the area should be addressed, residents should do so. The project was an initiative of the Rotterdam-Rijnmond police, where two police officers developed this method in 2009 in order to improve the involvement of citizens with safety issues in their neighbourhood. Only later the municipality got involved in the projects (Van Stokkom et al. 2012). In 2012 there were 42 committees active in the Rotterdam Area. At least ten other municipalities have now also introduced the method (Eysink Smeets et al. 2013). The neighbourhoods in which residents participate in these projects usually struggle with highly visible security problems.

Other cities have served as examples for the development of the committees in Rotterdam (Hoekman 2009). Among others Maastricht (Safe Neighbourhood Teams) and Amsterdam (Neighbourhood Safety Teams) used similar methods. The targets differ from one project to another. The Amsterdam teams try to solve persistent and serious nuisance problems. In Maastricht, however, the primary purpose is to let residents take responsibility for their environment and to increase involvement in the neighbourhood. The substantive focus is on nuisance and disorder in the public domain and how it interferes in the lives of residents.

Fundamental for this approach is to assess which incidents local residents worry about disproportionately and to seek solutions for those issues together with residents.[1] In these projects participating citizens have a say in policy implementation: they prioritize the problems which the police and the municipality should tackle.

The process of prioritizing is different for each project. In the Amsterdam Neighbourhood Safety Teams it is established by means of a survey of the neighbourhood population which results in a problem top-3. In Rotterdam prioritizing problems is carried out by the neighbourhood committees. These committees meet every four to twelve weeks, make an inventory of safety and quality of life problems, and determine how 200 hours of police deployment and 200 hours of city surveillance should be spent. After several months an evaluation takes place and the cycle starts again (Eysinck Smeets et al. 2013).

In Maastricht the teams, consisting of a community worker, a police officer, a municipality officer and representatives from housing associations, actively solicit the contribution of residents. They map the identified problems in neighbourhoods and involve residents by doing interviews in community centres, shopping malls and on street corners. This has the advantage that also those groups can be involved which are more difficult to reach. After collecting these inputs from residents a neighbourhood meeting is organised where the three most pressing problems are identified. In the next six to eight weeks the teams are working closely with the residents in order to address those problems. The teams expect the residents to actively participate: cleaning streets and addressing each other, for example when rubbish is thrown out by residents (Van den Brink & Bruinsma 2011).

2.3. Taking care of public space: residential budgets

Whereas in the 1990s professionals and citizens cooperated in a traditional, more top-down oriented approach[2], these days residents are encouraged to come up with their own proposals. When these residents have been allocated a budget, they can pursue their objectives, such as promoting the physical viability of a street. Already in the early 2000s budgets were used to motivate residents into undertaking community activities, e.g. in Rotterdam (Lub 2013). The well-known and long-established methodology of the Deventer Neighbourhood Approach also works with budgets (Van Stokkom et al. 2012). The Dutch central government has earmarked extra budgets for resident initiatives in the 40 so-called 'priority neighbourhoods'.

With these budgets, municipalities want to empower residents with regard to the viability of their neighbourhood (Tonkens & Verhoeven 2011). The goal is to improve the social and physical environment and to 'responsibilise' residents. Generally these aims are formulated in

[1] These principles have been adopted from 'reassurance policing' and the so-called Safer Neighbourhood Teams in England and Wales. For this 'policy transfer' see Van Stokkom 2013.

[2] Community workers encouraged citizens to develop a 'street agenda' and a 'street ladder'; these prearranged methods were too far removed from their everyday experiences (Lub 2013).

vague ways: initiatives should increase ‘involvement with the neighbourhood’ and promote ‘community development’ (Van Ankeren et al. 2010). Residential budgets in Amsterdam aim to connect residents and to improve the physical environment. Those who implement the initiatives tackle anti-social behaviour and ugly public spaces, or try to promote feelings of togetherness between residents.

Initially, civil servants and professionals used to decide about residential budgets, but in recent years those decisions lie more and more in the hands of the residents themselves. In some municipalities the allocation of budgets is being done by a steering committee of local residents. In the city of Groningen special ‘voting-days’ have been organized, where residents gather information about initiatives and then vote for their favourite. In some cities, such as Eindhoven, neighbourhood consultation only takes place when deciding on initiatives with a value of more than 10,000 euro.

This means that municipalities transfer a degree of decision making power to the residents (Engbersen 2010; Alleato 2012). Subsequently, the implementation of the initiatives is done by the applicants of the budget. The municipality and other institutions such as housing associations have a facilitating role. In the Deventer Neighbourhood Approach, residents are considered producers of their own living environment. They decide which problems need to be addressed in the neighbourhood (prioritization), how those problems can be addressed, what their contribution will be and which budget is needed. A neighbourhood officer and a community worker (the so-called ‘neighbourhood duo’) support initiatives by residents, such as cleanups, coordinate and act as driving force (Van Stokkom et al. 2012).

In a couple of ways, there are significant differences between the three previously described forms of participation. First, the ‘neighbourhood governs’-projects are initiated by the municipalities and are designed top-down. Municipality and police clearly establish the framework. Participating citizens merely indicate which problems should be addressed. By contrast, most neighbourhood watch teams originate bottom-up and the participants have an active patrolling role. A more mixed picture appears in projects carried out within the framework of residential budgets. Usually a neighbourhood team, advisory or steering committee determines which projects are selected (and provided with a budget), but the implementation is almost entirely in the hands of the residents themselves.

Secondly, in both ‘neighbourhood governs’-committees and residential budget initiatives, there is a transfer of decision making power to residents. This means that decision-making about tackling neighbourhood problems shifts to non-representative bodies. Municipalities have committed themselves to this shift and give support to these projects. In case of neighbourhood watch teams such a transfer of decision making does not take place. The initiative is usually not coming from the municipality or the police. As long as the police see no danger in the activities of the teams, they leave them untouched or support these initiatives wherever they find desirable.

3. Professionals: crafting & improvising

The professionals involved in the three forms of citizen participation outlined above have to deal with many different problems and develop particular strategies and methods that do not belong to their standard repertoire. They are supposed to support citizens and to involve them in the projects. Doing so they make decisions which might not be automatically endorsed by their own

organization. Which difficulties do these professionals face and how do they deal with that? In short, how do they craft and improvise, and in which ways do they develop their own distinctive order outside of the prevailing policy and bureaucratic approaches?

3.1. Neighbourhood watch teams

Overall, the organization of a neighbourhood watch teams is determined by residents themselves: arranging the schedule of surveillance, relaying messages to the police, liaising with the police and the municipality, etc. Community police officers generally have an advisory role but simultaneously try to get a grip on the initiatives. They are wary of citizens taking their role beyond merely signalling irregularities. Taking the law into their own hands, let alone vigilantism, is out of the question, and in the Netherlands this does not occur in any serious shape or form (as far as that could be established) (Van der Land 2014a; Lub 2016).

Because a formal policy with regard to the teams is virtually missing, special skills are required from the police officers involved. On the one hand, they encourage the teams to be committed to goals that are consistent with government policies. On the other hand, the commitment of citizens must be taken seriously in order to prevent them from becoming demotivated or turning away from a government that is 'doing nothing'. That these skills vary from one individual police officer to another should not be surprising. Only a few officers hardly care about the particular activities of the watchmen (Van der Land 2014a). Most officers are very committed to steering the teams to be in tune with regular police work. They adopt a realist position: the commitment of the participants may fluctuate and they should not make too strong demands. Some police officers conduct a dialogue between neighbourhood residents how the teams can potentially contribute to police objectives.

The variation in the way local police officers relate to the teams indicates that they have much room to manoeuvre. They are not supposed to explain their choices to their superiors. As long as participants do not resist police-work or evade the law, colleagues in the police organization will not interfere in their approach. What is required from them is that they improve contacts with local residents and boost their confidence in the police. Being able to improvise is an essential aspect of the functioning of community police officers, especially in the way they approach the network of residents and other professionals.

3.2. 'Neighbourhood governs'-committees

Whereas dealing with neighbourhood watch teams is an obvious element in the work of police officers, this is not always the case with regard to neighbourhood projects in which residents actually determine which problems the police should tackle. In the Amsterdam Neighbourhood Safety Teams community police officers are expected to take the lead and also take on tasks that do not primarily belong to the police profession, like continuously monitoring and motivating municipal employees and citizens. Many constables show an assertive attitude, especially in order to break down bureaucratic barriers. Some of them are very committed, believing in collaboration, easily making connections and gaining the trust of citizens (Van Stokkom 2013).

The work of these professionals is constantly devoted to crafting and improvising: liaising with many people in a variety of networks, navigating between different interests, encouraging people and keeping up the momentum of the process. At the same time they temper the demands and expectations of citizens. In fact, these professionals operate as (crisis)managers

of the projects; they have to achieve results quickly and overcome problems every day, including the lack of cooperation on the part of municipal and police organizations. Municipal departments work with fixed annual plans; staff and resources cannot be allocated quickly to meet the demands of the neighbourhood at once.

However, police officers regularly question this crafting and improvising role. The projects are time-consuming and require much effort and commitment. Other officers are cautious regarding the involvement of active citizens in determining the problem-solving approach, as it seriously complicates matters. Or they indicate that they already have sufficient understanding of neighbourhood problems; the information of residents is at best indicative. Many police officers tend 'naturally' to see residents as mere informants. In Amsterdam it is difficult to get beyond this reflex and actually engage citizens as partners (Van Stokkom 2013).

The same applies to Rotterdam. Moreover, in this city many participants are not really happy with the actions and performances of the police and the municipality. Committee members complain that professionals do not take up their suggestions or have not kept their promises to take action. For these and other reasons the professionals often adjust and restrict the committee's ambitions and try to temper citizens' expectations (Schuilenburg 2016).

Sometimes a joint approach is complicated by opposed perspectives of professional partners. In the Safe Neighbourhood Teams in Maastricht cooperation between police and housing associations did not really take off, partly due to differences in value orientations. Furthermore, there was the problem of dual steering with on the one hand the agenda of the project-manager, the municipality and the alderman, and on the other hand the preferences of the residents. Professionals have to find a difficult balance between wishes from above and demands from below. Some professionals struggle with many different and intersecting tasks; police officers, for example, are assumed to perform the role of community workers (Van den Brink and Bruinsma 2011).

3.3. Residential budgets

Municipality managers and advisors dealing with residential budgets mainly facilitate these initiatives; generally, they leave behind these initiatives once they are beyond the start-up phase. The municipal officials generally bear no responsibility for the end results. However, they should ensure that the projects meet the required criteria. In addition, they have an advisory and a connecting role: providing community groups with information and, if necessary, making contacts for them with other municipal departments and professionals (Oude Vrielink & Van de Wijdeven 2011).

Within the municipal organization there is sometimes little support for residential budgets (Alleato 2012). Some administrators and councillors think that residents cannot just take over civil service tasks and that these initiatives do not fit in with a representative democracy (Engbersen et al. 2010). Many officials consider the budgets as a threat or disruption of existing policies: the initiatives may damage regular municipal policies. In fact, an alternative field of various neighbourhood initiatives has been added to the municipal policy programme. This may lead to tensions and clashes between citizens and officials. For example, some residential initiatives may thwart the municipal maintenance of parks and lawns. Or the use of materials in playgrounds may conflict with requirements set by the municipal regulations.

The neighbourhood officials involved will often exert internal pressure to find support for local initiatives. Many cannot handle this new role and tend to comply with internal bureaucratic

demands. They are unable to overcome bureaucratic obstacles in order to create space for residential initiatives. Some coordinators and advisors have trouble taking up a facilitating and supportive role (Engbersen et al. 2010).

4 Representativeness and protecting public interests

From a democratic perspective, the interests of all groups of residents, streets and neighbourhood blocks should be taken into account. But within the three discussed forms of citizen participation representativeness is often inadequate. Only a small group of active citizens is involved, and this group may take decisions over the heads of other people. How do the professionals involved deal with this problem? Do they take into account the interests of non-participating groups? Do they discourage one-sided and biased views? In this section we sketch which problems of representativeness do occur within the three forms of citizen participation and how professionals handle it.

4.1. Neighbourhood watch teams

Neighbourhood watch teams evolve rarely by recruiting systematically under various sections of the population. The active residents that become part of it, push themselves forward or they are recommended by other residents or a professional. Participants in neighbourhood watch teams, and especially those who are the driving force, are often elderly residents who define the behaviour of some neighbourhood groups as antisocial or threatening and want to do something (Van der Land 2014a). Often these participants are not considered as representatives of the neighborhood. Some participants are distrusted because they emphasize too much that other residents should be controlled; some are even considered as ‘traitors’. In turn, these neighborhood watchmen can become reluctant to pass on information to the police or they do that selectively. This militant behaviour may prevent other people to participate in the teams (see also Crawford, 2006; Terpstra, 2008).

Social tensions may manifest themselves through the phenomenon of neighborhood watch: a group of residents may organize itself under the guise of ‘responsible citizenship’ to control other ‘irresponsible citizens’. This group is thus supposedly loyal to the public interest, the others are not. Or conversely, the watchmen are supposedly ‘traitors’, the others are loyal residents. There is in fact a risk of polarization between residents, possibly culminating in exclusion, which is closely linked to the way citizens are labeling other citizens (Crawford 1998). To prevent these social tensions, police officers discourage risky or doubtful initiatives of neighbourhood watch, for example, when the activities of the watchmen would be biased towards one group of residents. The police is generally reluctant to share information about the identity of suspects with neighborhood watch teams.

Police officers try to improve the representativeness of the watchmen by paying attention to the composition of the teams: various ethnic backgrounds and age groups should be represented. However, whereas most resident gatherings and committees do have a more or less fixed composition, the involvement of members of neighbourhood watch teams is generally temporarily and short-lived. Frequently specific incidents, such as car fires or burglaries, give rise to start a team; when the problems diminish the teams lose their urgency and members.

4.2. ‘Neighbourhood-governs’-committees

Only a relatively small group of active residents is involved in ‘neighbourhood governs’-committees. The circle of active residents is usually – in terms of background characteristics such as age, gender, education and ethnicity – not representative of the neighbourhood. As a rule, this problem is seen not so much in terms of ‘mass’ (‘how many people are reached?), but in terms of ‘what groups of residents are achieved?’ The evaluation in Rotterdam (Eysenck Smeets et al. 2013) shows that in nearly all neighbourhoods a vanguard of active residents is involved in the committees. Although the committees are accessible and open to all individuals, the lack of representativeness is considered as a serious bottleneck. Particularly immigrant residents and young people are underrepresented in most committees. However, the Rotterdam-study shows that there is an adequate representation of the local problems that are discussed and addressed in the committees. This means that non-participating residents agree with the selected problem-approaches. Nevertheless, about two-thirds of the residents are not aware that the projects take place. The participants involved agree that communication to the wider community should be taken up much better. Similar problems arise in other municipalities, such as in Amsterdam (Van Stokkom 2013).

Professionals try to ensure that all participants have their say. Sometimes, laissez faire styles prevail: ‘just yell it out’. The agenda is then established on a ‘first come, first served’ style (see also Fung 2004). Therefore, it is possible that only problems are addressed in streets where the participants themselves live. However, the professionals generally manage to give the deliberation structure, so participants rank neighbourhood problems by severity and urgency.

Generally, they also succeed, as 'guardians' of the whole project, to voice unrepresented interests. They counterbalance biased opinions of assertive residents, especially after incidents that have caused unrest and anger is quickly turned against groups such as young people and the homeless. Especially in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, this impartiality is of great importance. Community police officers usually invest a great deal of work to get in touch with marginal groups. They are well aware that in fragmented and ethnically divided neighbourhoods, the police can be easily accused of biased views.

Professionals are supposed to account the results to the broader population. In ‘neighbourhood governs’-projects this aim is not always given its due. Although neighbourhood newspapers and municipality-websites pay attention to the projects, it is questionable whether this information reaches the wider population. If a lot of emphasis is placed on contacting residents as in Maastricht, the population is more familiar with the development of the projects. That requires relatively very much effort from the professionals involved.

4.3. Residential budgets

In these projects, the problem of representativeness manifests itself at three levels: in the recruitment and composition of the groups who decide on budget applications, in the distribution of applications among the wider population, and in the distribution of the approved applications under the initiators. A nationwide study shows that most applicants are already active in the neighbourhood (Tonkens & Kroese 2009). However, the accessibility of the system ensures that there are also proposals coming in from groups which are normally difficult to reach. Another study shows that initiators are more rooted in the neighbourhood, more active in volunteering and often members of neighbourhood associations (Tonkens & Verhoeven 2011). There are relatively many women, young people, immigrants and people with low incomes among the

initiators. On the other hand, the participants in Deventer – which is already underway for decades with residential budgets – are predominantly older men with a job or retired. Young people and ethnic minorities are underrepresented (Van Stokkom et al. 2012).

There are indications, however, that the themes of the applications are representative of the typical problems in the neighbourhoods (Van Ankeren et al. 2010). The initiatives seem to address the broader experienced neighbourhood-problems. However, allocation of budgets sometimes leads to tensions between resident-groups, partly because of doubts about honesty and integrity of other initiators (Tonkens & Verhoeven 2011). Many have doubts about the fairness of the procedure and have the feeling of not being recognized. A majority would have a 'desire for bureaucracy': they want more control, accountability and stricter procedures. This is hardly surprising because most applicants do not receive a budget. By contrast, resident-groups succeeding to achieve a budget, do have a nice opportunity to realise their plans. The question is whether the format of residential budgets – provoking initiatives and honouring the most promising proposals – can prevent an uneven distribution of allocated budgets between groups of residents (and blocks and streets).

For these reasons the professionals involved consider it very important that new groups of participants compete for a budget. There must be enough flow, also to solidify support among residents. Deventer-professionals ensure that active residents are replaced in due time for others. Membership of the district team (where budgets are allocated) is bound to maximum periods. The municipal officials are actively looking for new members for the district teams; they also encourage juveniles and immigrants to submit plans (Oude Vrielink & Van de Wijdeven 2008; Van Stokkom et al. 2012). Generally, the professionals involved are not accountable for the communication of the selected applications and the final results of the projects to the wider population. Usually, they focus on facilitating the projects and monitoring how the budgets are spent.

5. Conclusions

The citizen participation projects discussed in this chapter, show how professionals are crafting local practices, with each other and in cooperation with citizens. Police officers monitor neighbourhood watch groups and intervene when participants have the intention to act militantly. In fact, their approach is in accordance with their task to regulate public order issues: the 'cat and mouse'-game between loitering juveniles and neighbourhood watch teams should remain manageable and should not escalate. In 'neighbourhood governs'-projects police (or municipality) professionals perform the role of manager: inviting participants, keeping contacts, monitor progress, and constantly boost the project. In case of residential budgets, municipality managers and advisers are navigating between regulatory requirements and existing municipal policies on the one hand and facilitation of resident initiatives on the other.

The professionals discussed here, try to enhance security and quality of life by facilitating local initiatives. Often, they have to make a lot of fuss to be heard and many have conflicts with the organizations for which they are working (police, municipality, housing associations, etc.); the 'institutional logic' prevents to act quickly and flexibly. Sometimes they have to 'intrude' into the programming of municipal organizations; whether that succeeds often depends on allies within the municipality, such as an alderman who wants to see quick results in terms of public safety.

The professionals involved must also be ready and able to build bridges between different policy domains. In many ways, they function as 'policy entrepreneurs' who invest much time and energy into the project, connecting people, agenda's and services to one another. They can also, in some respects, be called 'boundary spanners', working between two or more organizational systems (Van Hulst et al. 2012).

Obviously, professionals take on diverse crafting tasks. In 'neighbourhood governs'-committees the challenge is to find a good fit between the project format and the specific local context. Fine-tuning is needed. This is also true for municipal officials who facilitate projects in the context of residential budgets. For police officers dealing with neighbourhood watch teams this is rather the opposite. They try to structure spontaneous initiatives so that they fit in with existing police policies.

Municipality officials and community police officers involved in 'neighbourhood governs'-projects have to deal with diverging interests. In that respect, they are often forced to take on the role of referee in the discussion on the provision of solutions that contribute to local safety and quality of life. They feel compelled to counter parochial interests and unreasonable demands of residents and to oppose hostile language (Van Stokkom & Toenders 2010). This also applies to the regulation of neighbourhood watch teams. But coordination of these teams remains generally invisible; the police officers involved do not often account the team-activities to the police organization, nor neighbourhood organizations.

In both 'neighbourhood governs' and residential budget projects, citizens are explicitly invited to present their ideas. Municipality and police have committed themselves to take their input seriously. Thus, there evolved a playing field of problem solving beyond the usual democratic policies of the municipality. Although these projects are situated outside formal political institutions and there is no democratic authorization, the professionals involved are often doing 'political work': keeping conflicts manageable and ensure the interests of all. By contrast, police officers dealing with neighbourhood watch teams act primarily as frontline workers, developing suitable ways to prevent problems.

Only a small group of concerned citizens is active. This group is sometimes called a 'participatory elite', consisting of mainly older men with higher education. However, the participation projects discussed are accessible to all residents, and consequently may function as correctives to spontaneously contacts between the generally powerful residents and police officers (lobbying). Interestingly, the apparent lack of representativeness is rarely challenged by non-participating residents. This can be explained by the predominantly 'a-political' characteristics of the projects. Among local residents, there is a large consensus on the objectives of 'clean, intact and safe'. In 'neighbourhood governs'-projects the problem-solving approaches which were adopted by the 'vanguard' of active citizens, are usually supported by the broader group of non-participating residents.[3] From the vantage point of *what* is represented, the small group of active citizens having decision-making power, therefore does not have to pose a problem of principle.[4] However, once there is a conflict of interests, the political factor comes in.

[3] Based on research in Chicago, Skogan (2004) concluded that the public gives priority to substantially the same neighbourhood problems as the relatively small group of participants during the monthly 'beat meetings' (despite the fact that the participants have a predominantly middle-class profile). Also recent Dutch research (Bakker et al. 2011) shows that there are virtually no differences between the ideas of the 'passive' residents and the most active residents. They are concerned about the same local problems.

[4] Dutch research (Van Marissing 2008) shows that passive residents often do not have many objections to the possibility that some residents take active decisions about addressing neighbourhood problems, or they have no

For example, residents, retailers and night life entrepreneurs may quarrel about the question how to tackle loitering.

In short, there are particular expectations of the public professionals involved. Recruiting citizens, connecting people and simultaneously adjust their aspirations and demands; safeguard public interests and always ensure an orderly advancement of the projects. Partly for these reasons many professionals do not accept the additional responsibilities they face; they don't want to be a 'policy entrepreneur' or a 'public craftsman' but a cop or a civil servant.

The general claim of this book is that organizational forms are gradually shifting from formal systems to informal practices which facilitate improvising work approaches. In the context of local social security policies this claim is undoubtedly correct: local institutions are more and more involved in crafting and creating malleable ad hoc policies. Practitioners as police constables and executive municipal officials often function as leaders of these crafting communities, the local assemblages of collaborative actors. Still, they keep on belonging to the 'old world' (see chapter 1). The fact is that these professionals cannot allow to be absorbed in local social dynamics. Not so much because they have to comply with the institutional logic of the state or the municipality, but because they have to symbolise an impartial attitude. They are expected – see also the last section – to convey democratic norms and to oppose, amongst other things, aggressive behaviour and unreasonable claims.

6. Discussion

In this final section we will make four critical comments. A first issue is that unreasonable expectations of aggrieved citizens may define local security policies. Often residents complain about young people without being fully aware of their actions and intentions. Juveniles are at risk to be targeted by the police and defend themselves against it. Some ethnic groups are also considered as 'police property'. Regardless of their actual behaviour, there is a chance that these people are downgraded to marginal residents. If they are persistently the object of control, neighbourhood-tensions may increase. After major incidents that cause much consternation in the neighbourhood, it is expected that the police act immediately against the (alleged) perpetrators, often young people, junks and homeless people. The police may take too much account of emotional expressions and expectations of the majority of the population. Another risky aspect is that the most aggrieved citizens will always demand more government action (De Leeuw & Van Swaaningen 2011). Usually, professionals are aware of these risks. They realize that they have to take account of the interests of non-participating groups and, if necessary, correct the participants' choices.

Secondly, and simultaneously, this 'political' role of professionals raises new questions: are they ready and able to act as impartial agents? Do they have the urge to account the results of the projects to the broader community? A related question is whether the position of professionals is too dominant. There is a danger that professionals decide what's going to happen and set the agenda: 'Sorry ma'am, that's no safety issue!'

Thirdly, citizen initiatives cannot always relieve municipal policies, as is often claimed in a time of austerity measures and cutbacks. Especially in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, self-

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strong opinion about. A majority of residents agree that those who do not take the opportunity to participate, have to accept that decisions may turn out to have a negative impact. While clearly told what the possibilities of participating are and what process is planned, most residents seem to have no problem with it. But many residents still want to be well informed of what is happening in their neighbourhood (see also Van Stokkom et al. 2013).

organization is generally difficult to launch. Trust in institutions is lower. For that reason, the presence of professionals with a strong personality (‘best persons') and ‘street-credibility’ is a decisive factor to stimulate citizen participation (Van Marissing 2008; Carr 2006; Van Hulst et al. 2012). A local government that gains results in terms of security and quality of life is another important factor (Van der Land et al. 2014: chapter 4).

A final issue is the uneven distribution of public goods. The implementation of quality of life and safety projects can be divided unevenly across neighbourhoods and districts. Some neighbourhoods are deprived of neighbourhood watch teams, others reap the benefits. Some streets are devoid of an approach to tackle nuisance while other streets do have that approach because a committee decided so. Participation projects can therefore result in unequal outcomes: some streets have been refurbished and are safer; other streets remain ragged and devoid of supervision. Results may vary greatly by district and within districts. Research into residential budgets in Utrecht (Van den Boom 2013) shows that municipal advisors and consultants focus on the ‘stronger’ budget-receiving groups, while the mass of residents is out of the picture. An unintended effect may be that differences between neighbourhoods with or without self-organizing capacity increase. This new inequality can be exacerbated by cuts on community work and welfare accommodations.

This implies that participation-formats are important: these should preferably promote the interests of all. In ‘neighbourhood governs’-committees the participants are considered to take into account the interests of all areas in the broader community. The professionals involved are supposed to correct one-sided proposals. When it comes to residential budgets professionals – including municipal advisors – have fewer opportunities to safeguard the interests of all residents. There is no discussion about which problem areas should be tackled and which common approach is needed. For these reasons, we should keep a watchful eye on the ‘free play of participation forces’ that some supporters of the do-it-yourself-democracy have in mind.

For principle reasons local security policies should not stimulate a ‘market’ of citizen initiatives. Security is a basic need and a common good that should be available to every citizen. Enabling citizens in order to address issues of security, could be stimulated where possible, but in the end providing security remains primarily a collective task (Terpstra 2010; Loader & Walker 2007). All citizens, whether benefiting from grass root initiatives or not, should be protected. When it comes to quality of life issues (for example: implementing playgrounds for children) these risks are possibly less significant. In such cases, there seems to be less need for professionals to offer protection, readjust or keep control.

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